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COMMENTS
to annul a judgment of an appellate court. Under the circum-
stances, it would appear that a more reasonable and workable
interpretation was available. The court might well have inter-
preted the phrase "court which rendered the same" as meaning
the court rendering the judgment which first had jurisdiction of
the cause. Such a construction would do no violence to the letter
of the law and furthermore comports well with the other provi-
sions of the Code of Practice relating to the nullity of judgments.
Either of these arguments might have been seized upon by
the court in the Melangon case in order to avoid creating this
unfortunate hiatus in our law. If the ruling in that decision is to
be followed, the only way remaining to obviate the difficulty is
an amendment to Article 608 expressly empowering the district
courts to annul judgments of appellate courts.
KENNETH J. BAILEY
THE EFFECT OF ARTICLE 2462 OF THE
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
The meaning of Article 2462 of the Louisiana Civil Code and
its equivalent1 in the French Civil Code has been the subject of
much controversy. It is the purpose of this study to consider the
rules of agreements relating to sales in order to ascertain the
meaning of the article and to see how it has been applied. It will
first be necessary to examine briefly the theories of the French
writers on the article from which Article 2462 was taken.
FRENCH LAW
ARTICLE 1589, FRENCH Civm CODE:
La promesse de vente vaut vente, lorsqu'il y a consentement
rdciproque des deux parties sur a la chose et sur le prix.
(Translation) The promise of sale amounts to a sale, when
there exists reciprocal consent of the two parties on the thing
and on the price.2
In order to understand the interpretations that have been
given to the above article, it is necessary to look briefly at the
rules existing in French customary law. A sale or a contract of
1. Art. 1589, French Civil Code.
2. Cf. Art. 2437, La. Civil Code of 1825.
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sale did not transfer ownership of the thing.3 It was necessary to
have a clause of tradition which served as the conveyance. Al-
though the writers did not except the sale of movables from this
rule, it is difficult to believe that a clause of tradition was neces-
sary if the sale was not required to be in writing. Under the
maxim-la promesse de vente vaut vente-the promise of sale was
equivalent to a sale and did not convey ownership. The difficulty
at customary law centered around determining whether a unilat-
eral promise of sale was obligatory. It was contended by some
that the obligation to sell was an obligation to do and could not
be specifically enforced. Pothier, in accord with the majority of
customs, said that the obligation was one to give, and not to do,
and that the promisor was obligated to perform, the promisee not
being relegated to his action for damages.'
Article 1583 of the French Civil Code changed the effect of the
contract of sale in customary law by providing that title would
pass immediately. Notwithstanding this, the redactors included in
Article 1589 the maxim, la promesse de vente vaut vente. This
raises a problem relative to the intention of the redactors. Did
they intend to retain the rule that had existed at customary law,
under which the promise of sale did not transfer ownership; or did
they intend that the promise of sale should be equivalent to a sale
under the Code and that title should be thereby transferred? An-
other problem occasioning great difficulty is whether promesse de
vente in Article 1589 includes both unilateral and bilateral prom-
ises of sale., Both these problems deserve consideration.
The majority of the writers," in accord with the jurisprudence
3. 1 Guillouard, Trait~s de la vente & de l'Exchange (2 ed. 1890) 90, no
77; 10 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1932) 185,
no 175, at n. 2.
4. 3 Pothier, Oeuvres (2 ed. 1861) 191, no 487.
5. It is surprising that no one foresaw these difficulties. Little explanation
of the article was given on its presentation by the redactors. For discussion
of the presentation to the Conseil d'Etat, see 1 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note
3, at 84, no 72. See 14 Fenet, Recueil Complet des Travaux Pr6paratoires du
Code Civil (1836) 115; 14 Locr6, La LUgislation Civile, Commerciale et Crimi-
nelle de la France (1828) 133, 147; 1 Guillouard, supra, at 84, no 72, in relation
to the discussion before the Corps lgislatif. With regard to the presentation
before the Tribunat see 14 Fenet, supra, at 153, 154, 189; 14 Locra, supra, at
193, 224, 238. The Court of Appeal of Lyon criticized the article, but its re-
marks are of little value in clarifying it. 4 Fenet, supra, at 181-182.
6. 5 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangals (5 ed. 1907) 4-5, § 349;
19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de Droit
Civil, De la Vente et de l'Exchange (3 ed. 1908) 50, no 69; 2 Colmet de San-
terre, Manuel El6mentaire de Droit Civil (4 ed. 1901) 134; 16 Duranton, Cours
de Droit Frangals (3 ed. 1834) 76, no 51; 1 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 3, at
89, no 77; 10 Huc, Commentaire Th~orique & Pratique du Code Civil (1897) 41,
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of France,7 contend that Article 1589 comprehends only synallag-
matic promises. They point to the requirement that there must be
reciprocal consent, which they interpret to mean that one party
must promise to sell, the other to buy. Consequently, they con-
clude that unilateral promises are not governed by Article 1589
but by the general rules of obligations. These writers argue that
title is transferred by the bilateral promise of sale and under their
theory it therefore becomes unnecessary to distinguish between a
sale as defined by Article 1583 and a synallagmatic promise of
sale. Under this view the sale conveys title by virtue of Article
1583; the bilateral promise of sale transfers ownership by virtue
of Article 1589; and the unilateral promise of sale is obligatory by
virtue of the general rules of obligations.
In opposition to the above view, a few writers8 contend that
a bilateral promise of sale, when there is consent as to the thing
and price, is by definition a sale.9 They point out that the require-
ment of reciprocal consent in Article 1589 means only that the
parties have agreed on and determined the thing and the price,
although the future vendee has not yet promised to buy. They
conclude that bilateral promises to sell are sales by virtue of
Article 1583 and are not comprehended by Article 1589, which in
modern language is applicable only to so-called options to sell.
It is contended by these writers that Article 1589 was intended
to provide that unilateral promises were obligatory and thus to
avoid the dispute which, it has been shown, existed under early
customary law.
The great majority of writers are of the opinion that the
bilateral promise of sale transfers ownership. Some reach this
conclusion by relying on Article 1589, while others base their
contention on Article 1583. Likewise they agree that unilateral
promises to sell are obligatory. In reaching this conclusion some
no 24; 1 Larombi~re, Th~orie et Pratique des Obligations (nouvelle ed. 1885)
447, Art. 1138, no 11; 24 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (1877) 27,
no 21.
7. Cass. 2 mai 1827, Dalloz 1827.1.226; Req. 26 mars 1884, Dalloz 1884.1.403,
Sirey 1886.1.341; Chamb~ry 31 janvier 1894, Dalloz 1895.2.347, Sirey 1896.2.102.
8. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 3, at 184, no 175.
9. Art. 1583, French Civil Code: "Elle est parfait entre les parties, et Za
propridtd est acquise de droit 4 Pacheteur 4 Z'dgard du vendeur, dds qu'on est
convenu de la chose et du prix, quoique la chose n'Wait pas encore dtd livrds
ni le prix payd."
(Translation) "It is perfect between the parties, and the ownership is
acquired of right to the purchaser with regard to the seller, as soon as there
exists an agreement as to the thing and as to the price, although the object




rely upon Article 1589, while others look to the general rules of
obligations.
Still a third group,' though taking the position that Article
1589 is applicable only to bilateral promises, contend that title is
not thereby conveyed. They rely on the intention of the parties
and say that if such intention is to transfer title immediately, the
agreement is a sale. If, on the other hand, the intention is that
title be not transferred until a future time, the agreement con-
stitutes a promise to sell governed by Article 1589; that is, the
contract does not serve to convey ownership but only to obligate
the parties to perform.
It is generally held in France that an agreement to sell in the
future transfers title at the time of the agreement, if there is
consent as to the thing and price." However, the parties may
agree expressly that the property shall be at the risk of the ven-
dor until a future time. Under such an agreement the vendor
retains the risk, although title is transferred by operation of law.12
When the parties agree to reduce the contract to an authentic act
in the future, the question of whether the passage of title will in
the meantime be suspended is one of intention. 8 If the court finds
that the parties intended that title should not pass until the exe-
cution of the authentic act, this intention will control. On the
other hand, if it is found that the intention was that the future
instrument should be a complimentary formality, passage of title
will not be suspended.
It is difficult to justify the existence of Article 1589 in the
French Civil Code. Without it a bilateral promise of sale in which
there was consent as to the thing and price would be a sale under
Article 1583 unless the parties expressed an intention that the
sale should not be complete until a later time. The parties in the
latter case would be obligated to perform under the rules of obli-
gations relating to contracts to give. Likewise, a unilateral prom-
ise to sell would be obligatory under such rules. Since Article
1589 is applicable only when there is a determined thing and
10. 6 Marcad6, Explication Th6orique et Pratique du Code Civil (7 ed.
1875) 163, Art. 1589; Troplong, Le Droit Civil Expliqu6, 1 De la Vente (5 ed.
1856) 148-164, nos 125-132.
11. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 6, at 5, § 349, n. 8; 1 Guillouard, op.
cit supra note 3, at 93, no 78; 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 6, at 30, no 22;
3 Moulon, R~ptitions Ecrites sur le Troisime Examen du Code Napoleon (4
ed. 1856) 183-184. Contra: 2 Colmet de Santerre, loc. cit. supra note 6; 7
Demante, Cours Analytique de Code Civil (2 ed. 1887) 19, no lObis :1.
12. 1 Guillouard, loo. cit. supra note 11.
13. See supra note 11.
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price, it has no application to promises to sell undetermined
goods. Consequently, it seems necessary to conclude that Article
1589 serves no useful purpose and has only confused matters
which otherwise would have been sufficiently clear.
LOUISIANA LAW
Article 1589 of the French Civil Code was copied into our
Code of 1825,14 with the addition of the requirement that the
promise be in writing in certain cases. Consequently, what was
said with respect to that article of the French Code is equally
applicable to Article 2462. The Louisiana courts, however, in
attempting to attribute some meaning to the article, have given it
a reasonable interpretation-at least insofar as it relates to im-
movables.
The courts have never given any clear definition of the terms
they employ. For the purpose of this discussion, therefore, it will
be necessary to define and distinguish several kinds of agree-
ments as they will be used here.
A sale or a contract of sale 5 will be treated as a transaction
in which there is agreement by both parties as to the thing and
the price, and a consent that title be presently transferred. Con-
tracts to sell16 are bilateral promises to sell in which the intention
is that title shall not pass immediately but in the future. In one
type of contract to sell there is a determined thing and price; in
the other type there is lacking agreement as to either the thing or
price. A promise to sell (promise of sale) will be regarded as a
unilateral promise which is binding on the promisor, even though
at the time it is given the promisee does not bind himself to buy.
The meaning of the expression promise to sell as used in Article
2462 of the Civil Code will be dealt with below.
Immovables
The Louisiana courts have interpreted Article 2462 as being
applicable to contracts to sell. Of course, in order that there may
be a contract to which the article will apply, the agreement must
meet the requirements for definiteness necessary for a contract. 17
Thus, where a contract does not provide for the terms of the
14. Art. 2437, La. Civil Code of 1825.
15. This definition is based on that given in the Uniform Sales Act, §1 (2),
1 U.L.A. 1 (1931).
16. Uniform Sales Act, § 1 (1), 1 U.L.A. 1 (1931).
17. Young v. Cistac, 157 La. 771, 103 So. 100 (1925); Dunn v. Spiro, 153 So.
316 (La. App. 1934).
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credit portion of the price, the price is indefinite and specific per-
formance cannot be decreed under the article. 18
A very recent case, Noto v. Blasco,19 reaffirms what was said
in M'Donald v. Aubert20 in 1841 with regard to the effect of con-
tracts to sell in Louisiana:
"We understand article 2437 [2462] to mean that a promise to
sell, when the thing to be sold and the price of it are agreed
upon, is so far a sale that it gives to either party a right
to claim rectd vid, the delivery of the thing or payment of the
price; but such a promise does not place the thing at the risk
of the promisee, nor does it transfer to him the ownership of
dominion of it. If by consent of both parties a promise to sell
is cancelled, such an agreement could not be viewed as a retro-
cession of the property; and third persons having a general
mortgage recorded against the promisee would have acquired
no right or lien on the same, because it never belonged to their
debtor."21
It will be noticed that the term promise to sell is here used by the
court to describe a contract to sell as defined above.
Since the M'Donald case Article 2462 has been relied upon
repeatedly to sustain the principle that a contract to sell immov-
ables does not transfer the ownership to the contemplated ven-
dee,22 but that by virtue of this article the parties have a right to
specific performance, and are not restricted to damages.2
18. Ibid.
19. 198 So. 429 (La. App. 1940).
20. 17 La. 448 (1841).
21. 17 La. at 450-451. The language in Troplong, op. cit. supra note 10, at
157, no 130, is substantially the same.
22. Peck v. Bemiss, 10 La. Ann. 160 (1855); Knox v. Payne & Harrison, 13
La. Ann. 361 (1858); Garrett v. Crooks, 15 La. Ann. 483 (1860); Broadwell v.
Raines, 34 La. Ann. 677 (1882); Thompson v. Duson, 40 La. Ann. 712, 5 So. 58
(1888); Baldwin v. Morey, 41 La. Ann. 1105, 6 So. 796 (1889); Collins v. Des-
maret, 45 La. Ann. 108, 12 So. 121 (1893); Girault v. Feucht, 117 La. 276, 41 So.
572 (1906); Capo v. Bugdahl, 117 La. 992, 42 So. 478 (1906); Lehman v. Rice,
118 La. 975, 43 So. 639 (1907); Smith v. Hussey, 119 La. 32, 43 So. 902 (1907);
Stafford v. Richard, 121 La. 76, 46 So. 107 (1908); Nosacka v. McKenzie, 127
La. 1063, 54 So. 351 (1911); Page v. Loeffler, 146 La. 890, 84 So. 194 (1920);
Pruyn v. Gay, 2 La. App. 787 (1925); McMillan v. Lorimer, 160 La. 400, 107
So. 239 (1926); Richmond v. African Methodist Church, 4 La. App. 191 (1926);
Cusachas v. Columbia Fire Ins. Co., 6 La. App. 15 (1927); Joe Dover v. Atlas
Assur. Co., 15 La. App. 132 (1930); Succession of Premeaux, 17 La. App. 360
(1931); Bandel v. Sabine Lumber Co., 194 La. 31, 193 So. 359 (1940); Cerami v.
Haas, 197 So. 752 (La. 1940).
23. Girault v. Feucht, 117 La. 276, 41 So. 572 (1906); Lehman v. Rice, 118
La. 975, 43 So. 639 (1907); Nosacka v. McKenzie, 127 La. 1063, 54 So. 351 (1911);
Richardson v. Widow Rosey Caloavello, 3 La. App. 535 (1926); Amacker v.
[Vol. III
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As early as 1903 Article 2462 was also relied on by the court
to support a holding that a promise to sell in the form of an option
was binding on the promisor.24 Thus, prior to 1910, Article 2462
had been applied by the courts to hold that both contracts to sell
and promises to sell in the form of options were binding and
could be specifically enforced.
Article 2462 was amended in 1910.25 The phrase "promise to
sell" was retained in the amended article, but the right to enforce
specific performance was given to "either party." As a result the
first paragraph of the amended article necessarily referred to con-
tracts to sell. However, a second paragraph was added in order to
allow either party to an option contract to enforce it upon accept-
ance. This amendment at least indicates that there was some
doubt whether promises to sell (options) were comprehended by
the article before amendment. Since 1910, however, it is clear that
the first paragraph of the article provides for specific performance
of only contracts to sell; the second paragraph governs options,
that is, binding promises to sell.
Although specific performance will usually be granted, con-
veyance to a third person terminates the right to specific perform-
ance if the contract to sell is unrecorded.2 6 But if the contract to
sell has been recorded, third persons must take notice of it and
the sale to a third person can be annulled, the records cancelled,
and title conveyed according to the contract to sell.27 Further-
more, when the agreement is to sell upon the happening of some
condition, title does not immediately pass upon the happening of
the condition. The parties then have the right to sue for specific
McCarty, 8 La. App. 70 (1928); Yates v. Batteford, 19 La. App. 374 (1932);
Bandel v. Sabine Lumber Co., 194 La. 31, 193 So. 359 (1940); Ceraml v. Haas,
197 So. 752 (La. 1940).
24. Magruder v. Hornot, 110 La. 585, 34 So. 696 (1903).
25. La. Act 249 of 1910. This act was passed without a title and La. Act
3 of 1910 (2 E.S.) was enacted to remedy it.
26. Knox v. Payne & Harrison, 13 La. Ann. 361 (1858). It is obvious that a
purchaser without notice of the contract would secure the property free from
any unrecorded claim of the promisee. Art. 2266, La. Civil Code of 1870. It is
also clear that the promisor must be the owner and able to convey, or specific
performance cannot be decreed, the relief being only by way of damages.
Walshe v. Endom, 124 La. 697, 50 So. 656 (1909), where the promisor was not
owner of the land and specific performance was refused. Damages were
allowed in a subsequent trial. (129 La. 148, 55 So. 744 (1911)).
27. Lehman v. Rice, 118 La. 975, 43 So. 639 (1907); Whited & Wheless v.
Calhoun, 122 La. 100, 47 So. 415 (1908). But where the third party transferee
was not made a party defendant, the court refused to order the property
conveyed to the promisee. Richmond v. African Methodist Church, 4 La. App.
191 (1926). In Kinberger v. Drouet, 149 La. 986, 90 So. 367 (1922), it was held
that even a recorded option to buy served to protect the promisee's right as
against third party purchasers.
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performance of the obligation to convey;2 but until this convey-
ance is made, either voluntarily or by the court, title remains in
the original owner.29
The Louisiana courts have not been so much troubled in
making a determination of the effects of a contract to sell as in
their efforts to distinguish a completed sale from a contract to
sell. However, the rule appears to be that the parties must clearly
intend that title shall pass immediately in order that the contract
may constitute a sale; otherwise it will be considered a contract
to sell °0 The intention of the parties is determined from the en-
tire contract, and the words used in the contract are not always
decisive.8 1 The latest expression on the subject by a Louisiana
court sums up the principle accurately:
"An agreement for the sale of real estate, which contem-
plates the passing of the property not immediately and by
virtue of the agreement, but by an act to be executed at a later
date, and which contains all the elements of a sale, such as the
price, the property and the consent of the parties, is merely a
promise of sale, unless the intention of the parties clearly indi-
cates that the agreement is to constitute a completed sale. '82
Again, the court is referring to what has been called above a con-
tract to sell, and is not speaking of promise of sale as we have
28. Foreman v. Saxon, 30 La. Ann. 1117, 1118 (1878). But see Barfield v.
Saunders, 116 La. 136, 40 So. 593 (1906), where it was held that upon the
promisee's paying one of five notes given for the property and tender of
payment of the other four amounted to a completion of the sale. What served
as the act translative of title? Why would not tender of performance under
any bilateral contract serve to transfer title If this case is correct? In such
event, fhere would be no need for specific performance.
29. However, the contemplated buyer acquires a real right in the prop-
erty. Whited & Wheless v. Calhoun, 122 La. 100, 47 So. 415 (1908) (where such
a promisee was allowed to bring a petitory action). Furthermore, the right
that a person has under a contract to sell or an option to buy community
property is not destroyed by the dissolution of the community. Magruder v.
Hornot, 110 La. 585, 34 So. 696 (1903); Provensano v. Glaesser, 122 La. 378, 47
So. 688 (1908) [this case was expressly overruled on another point by Maloney
v. Aschaffenbury, 143 La. 507, 78 So. 761 (1918)]. Contra: M'Donald v. Aubert,
17 La. 448 (1841).
30. Smith v. Hussey, 119 La. 32, 43 So. 902 (1907).
31. The following expressions have been held to be only contracts to sell
and not sales: "I have this day agreed to sell." [Peck v. Bemiss, 10 La. Ann.
160 (1855)]; "I have this day bargained, sold, and delivered ... titles to said
property to be made at our convenience." [Broadwell v. Raines, 34 La. Ann.
677 (1882)]; "Sold this day [list of descriptions and conditions] when done,
Baldwin, or his heirs, will give good deed." [Baldwin v. Morey, 41 La. Ann.
1105, 6 So. 796 (1889)]; "This is to certify that I have this day sold my house
. ..balance when act of sale is passed." [Capo v. Bugdahl, 117 La. 992, 42
So. 478 (1906)]; "I have this day sold .. ."; "The act of sale ... is to be passed
within the next 15 days.. ." [Millaudon v. Brenan, 5 La. App. 583 (1927)].
32. Noto v. Blasco, 198 So. 429, 432 (La. App. 1940).
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defined that term. In a few very early cases the court took the
position that the intention to reduce the contract to another in-
strument did not prevent the passage of title by the first agree-
ment.3 3 These cases, however, are superseded by the many later
decisions to the contrary.3 4
With regard to unilateral promises to sell, the rules in Louisi-
ana are rather clear. Of course a mere promise, unaccepted, never
transfers title. If accepted during the existence of the offer, such
a promise ripens into a bilateral contract to sell,3 5 which may be
specifically enforced by either party. The most usual type of uni-
lateral promise to sell is known as an option, frequently granted
in connection with a lease.
The question of whether a simple promise to sell during a
certain period is binding on the promisor during that time has
been discussed elsewhere.3 6 In France, such an offer is binding
during the term and it has been suggested that the same result
should be reached in Louisiana.37 Pretermitting this question, if
the offer is accepted before retraction, a contract to sell is created.
Such acceptance has the same effect as acceptance under an op-
tion, and the result is the same as if a bilateral contract to sell
had originally existed. In other words, a contract to sell is formed
and it may be specifically enforced.
Prior to the amendment to Article 2462 in 1910, the rules of
Articles 2440 8 and 227539 were applicable equally to contracts to
33. Crocker v. Neiley, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 583 (La. 1825) (which interpreted a
contract entered into in 1811, prior to the adoption into our Code that a con-
tract to sell amounts to a sale); Pignatil v. Drouet, 6 Mart. (N.S.) 432 (La.
1828); Joseph v. Moreno, 2 La. 460 (1831); Stephens v. Chamberlin, 5 La. Ann.
656 (1850).
34. M'Donald v. Aubert, 17 La. 448 (1841); Peck v. Bemiss, 10 La. Ann. 160
(1855); Knox v. Payne & Harrison, 13 La. Ann. 361 (1858); Broadwell v.
Raines, 34 La. Ann. 677 (1882); Thompson v. Duson, 40 La. Ann. 712, 5 So.
58 (1888); Baldwin v. Morey, 41 La. Ann. 1105, 6 So. 796 (1889); Collins v.
Desmaret, 45 La. Ann. 108, 12 So. 121 (1893); Capo v. Bugdahl, 117 La. 992, 42
So. 478, (1906); Whited & Wheless v. Calhoun, 122 La. 100, 47 So. 415 (1908);
Noto v. Blasco, 198 So. 429 (La. App. 1940).
35. Magruder v. Hornot, 110 La. 585, 34 So. 696 (1903); Kinberger v.
Drouet, 149 La. 986, 90 So. 367 (1922); Moresi v. Burleigh, 170 La. 270, 127 So.
624 (1930); Chauvin v. Theriot, 180 So. 847 (La. App. 1938).
36. Comment (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 182. Although the writer of
this comment leaves open the discussion concerning offers to sell in view of
the option amendment, the present paper will not cover that subject.
37. Ibid.
38. La. Civil Code of 1870. This article makes all verbal sales of immov-
ables null, except as provided by Article 2275.
39. La. Civil Code of 1870. Verbal sales of immovables are good as be-
tween the parties if confessed when interrogated on oath, provided actual
delivery has been made.
1941]
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sell and to sales, under the express wording of Article 24620 Con-
sequently it was held that both the offer to sell immovables and
the acceptance must be in writing and an oral acceptance was in-
sufficient. Furthermore, the acceptance in writing must be made
before withdrawal of the offer.4 1 There are two cases which hold
that the acceptance need not be in writing but can be proved by
evidence aliunde.42 However, later cases state that the acceptance
must be in writing except in those cases falling within Article
2275.11 However, in a 1940 case, Cerami v. Haas,14 the court held
that a recordation of a written offer to sell amounted to an accept-
ance. Though the recordation was not a written acceptance, it
served all the purposes of a writing in the matter of proof and the
ability to enforce it against the acceptor; and the decision seems
entirely sound.
Thus, it can be said briefly that in Louisiana a bilateral agree-
ment concerning immovables, otherwise containing the require-
ments of a sale, will be treated as a contract to sell, rather than a
sale, unless it is clear that the parties intended that the agreement
itself should transfer title. A unilateral promise to sell becomes a
bilateral contract to sell upon acceptance before revocation and
has the same effect. An option to buy is binding during the term
given if it is supported by consideration, and upon acceptance a
bilateral contract is formed. Although title does not pass by the
contract to sell, both parties are obligated to convey and specific
performance may be required by either party under the authority
of Article 2462. Furthermore, when the contract to sell is re-
corded, a third party cannot acquire title. The court may order
its judgment to stand as title and make further conveyance un-
necessary.45
40. Cf. Mason v. Towne, 12 La. Ann. 194 (1857), where the court indicated
that had delivery been made, the verbal contract might have been good if
proved by interrogatories. See also cases decided since the article was
amended in 1910. Larido v. Perkins, 132 La. 660, 61 So. 728 (1913); Rubenstein
v. Files, 146 La. 727, 84 So. 33 (1920); Kidd v. Talbot, 147 So. 825 (La. App.
1933).
41. Levy v. Levy, 114 La. 239, 38 So. 155 (1905); Barchus v. Johnson, 151
La. 985, 92 So. 566 (1922); Conklin v. Caffall, 189 La. 301, 179 So. 434 (1938).
See also Landreneau v. Perrou, 174 So. 140 (La. App. 1937), where it was said
that the agreement to transfer immovables must be in writing but that
failure to allege that the contract was in writing did not furnish grounds
for sustaining an exception of no cause of action.
42. Crocker v. Neiley, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 583 (La. 1825) (which interpreted a
contract made In 1811); Joseph v. Moreno, 2 La. 460 (1831).
43. See note 39, supra.
44. 197 So. 752 (La. 1940).
45. Barfield v. Saunders, 116 La. 136, 40 So. 593 (1906); Murphy v. Hussey,
117 La. 390, 41 So. 692 (1906); Kinberger v. Drouet, 149 La. 986, 90 So. 367




There is nothing in the articles, nor in the writings of the
French commentators, to indicate that there should be any differ-
ence in treatment between promises and contracts to sell mov-
ables and those to sell immovables. The difficulties in Louisiana
appear to be based principally on the different rules of proof and
the recordation laws with respect to the two classes of property.
The cases dealing with contracts to sell movables arevery unsat-
isfactory and lend very little to an understanding of the problem.
The court has several times stated that a contract to sell movables
could not be enforced specifically if the goods were perishable or
readily merchantable articles fluctuating in price.4 6 In these cases
the court did not rely on Article 2462 but on the practical expe-
diency of the situation.
Suppose, however, it were agreed that the vendor, A, should
perform some act, such as a repair, before title should pass. If the
repair were made, title would pass ipso facto, as was explained
above. But suppose A refuses to repair. The vendee would sue for
performance, not of the obligation to sell, but rather of the obli-
gation to repair. This, of course, is an obligation to do and is con-
trolled by Articles 1926 and 1927. Consequently, Article 2462 is
again unnecessary and has no application.
Thus, though there may exist a valid contract to sell, in
which event title does not pass by the contract, there is no need
to seek specific performance under Article 2462.47
Unlike title to immovables, which is transferred only by an
instrument, title to movables may be transferred by mere oral
46. Land~che v. Sarpy, 37 La. Ann. 835 (1885); Mutual Rice Co. v. Star
Bottling Works, 163 La. 159, 111 So. 661 (1927); Leon Godchaux Clothing
Co. v. DeBuys, 10 La. App. 635 (1929). The court in the latter case said that
when the "vendee" refuses delivery, the "vendor" has the option to "resell"
or to demand specific performance. This, of course, is not based on Article
2462 which has no application to a completed sale, but is based on the obliga-
tion of the vendee to accept delivery under Article 2549. The case is unsatis-
factory in that the court does not make clear whether it considered the trans-
action a sale or a contract to sell.
Although the above limitations may be sound as a matter of policy, there
appears to be no justification for the doctrine under the articles of the Civil
Code. This principle, in effect, adopts the equity rule of specific performance
and makes our Code articles unnecessary. Although the result may be desir-
able, it is wholly unjustified by our codal provisions.
47. Although the doctrine of earnest money is very important to this
subject, a discussion thereof has been omitted here because it is treated in
Hebert, The Function of Earnest Money in the Civil Law of Sales (1930) 11
Loyola L. J. 121.
However, it may be added here that the doctrine of earnest money is not
applicable to options. Moresi v. Burleigh, 170 La. 270, 127 So. 624 (1930).
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consent. The remedy would be therefore to enforce delivery of
the thing under Article 2475 or the payment of the price under
Articles 2549 to 2555. The same would be true under an option
to buy.
Conclusion
The ownership of immovable property is transferred by vir-
tue of a written title. Title to movables is conveyed by the agree-
ment itself when there is an agreement as to the thing and price.
When there is such a transfer of ownership, the vendor is obli-
gated to deliver under Article 2475 and the vendee is bound to
pay the price under the authority of Articles 2549 and 2550. Con-
sequently, Article 2462 has no application to a completed sale of
movables or immovables.
The obligation to transfer the ownership of movables in the
future is executed by the mere passage of time, so there is no
need for seeking specific performance of the obligation to convey.
When it is agreed that there will be another instrument executed,
title to immovables does not transfer until the execution of such
instrument. In other words, it is presumed that the parties in-
tended that title should pass until then. This is only giving effect
to the presumed intention of the parties, and such contract could
be specifically enforced under Articles 1905 to 1925. The courts
created this presumption at an early time in an attempt to ascribe
some meaning to Article 2462.
It is concluded that Article 2462 gives no remedy not provided
for elsewhere in the Code. The courts in interpreting it have
achieved results that would have been reached without the
article. It is fortunate that the article has not been interpreted in
Louisiana as it was in France so as to deviate from the intention
of the parties and do violence to the other codal provisions. Al-
though the article is ambiguous and unnecessary, its application
in Louisiana has been wise.
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